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I. Introduction
When the Maryland Governor signed into law the nation’s first benefit
corporation legislation, state Senator Jamie Raskin remarked, “This is a great
moment in the evolution of commercial life in Maryland and America. We are
giving companies a way to do good and do well at the same time. The benefit
corporations will tie public and private purposes together.” A benefit corporation
is one of a handful of new business entities designed to accommodate businesses
that aim to benefit society in more ways than traditional corporations can through
contributions to shareholders, consumers, employees, and general economic
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growth.1 In a growing number of states, lawmakers have passed legislation creating
various new business entities to house social enterprise and organizations that
blend for-profit and not-for-profit purposes.2
Benefit corporations are best understood within the broader context of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its more recent offshoots, social
enterprise and organizations with hybrid purposes.3 Social enterprise is a general
term for business organizations with social and environmental purposes.4
Similarly, organizations with hybrid purposes mix attributes of the for-profit
and not-for-profit sectors.5 Opposed to traditional corporations, for-profit social
enterprise measures its success in terms of financial performance and advancement
of a social or environmental mission.6 The creators of the new legal form, the
benefit corporation, explain that hybrid organizations use “the power of business
to solve social and environmental problems.”7 Social enterprise and businesses
with hybrid purposes can have a primarily for-profit or a primarily not-for-profit
purpose, yet with either combination the organizations will incorporate social and
environmental responsibility into their policies and practices.8
The traditional binary organizational system of state corporate law and federal
tax law is not suited to accommodate the growing number of organizations with
hybrid for-profit and not-for-profit purposes.9 Traditional organizational structures
and organizational elections offered under state corporate law and federal tax law

1
Press Release, The Corporate Social Responsibility Newswire, Maryland First Sate in Union
to Pass Benefit Corp. Legislation (Apr. 14, 2010) (on file with author). A successful traditional
for-profit corporation can create significant social value because of consumers’ ability to purchase
its goods and services, the taxes it pays, and the jobs it creates for its employees and stakeholders.
Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 59, 86 n.162 (2010).
2

See infra notes 78–122 and accompanying text.

Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?,
34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1351, 1353 (2011). See generally Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social
Responsibility, 38 Bus. and Soc’y 268 (1999) (discussing the evolution of what is considered the
modern era of corporate social responsibility starting in the 1950s).
3

4

Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 86–93 (discussing definitions of social enterprise).

5 Linda O. Smiddy, The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 35
Vt. L. Rev. 3, 4 (2010).
6

Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 86.

7

Certified B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).

8

Katz & Page, supra note 1, at 86–93.

See generally James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 Mich. L. R. 1179, 1212 (2010) (discussing some of the tax
consequences of hybrid for-profit and not-for-profit entities). Federal tax law is beyond the scope
of this comment, but is referenced here and in the background section in order to establish some of
the problems that the current organizational system creates for organizations with hybrid purposes.
See infra notes 19–30 and accompanying text.
9
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draw distinctions based on an organization’s primary purpose as being for-profit or
not-for-profit.10 Additionally, traditional for-profit legal entities are not equipped
with accountability and transparency standards, which are necessary to evaluate
corporate social responsibility.11 In the past ten years, state legislators across the
country have responded to the shortcomings of the binary organizational system
by creating new legal forms to better house businesses with hybrid purposes.12
This comment begins with a short background to introduce the primarily
binary organizational system and its limitations on corporate social responsibility.13
The background also introduces three hybrid legal forms now available in various
states: the benefit corporation, the flexible purpose corporation, and the lowprofit limited liability company (L3C).14 Next, the analysis section demonstrates
how benefit corporation legislation addresses three problems that organizations
with hybrid purposes face as traditional for-profit corporate entities: (1) the
shareholder wealth maximization norm; (2) the lack of accountability standards;
and (3) the lack of transparency standards.15 The analysis argues that because of
a benefit corporation’s features that address these problems, it is a better form for
social enterprise than a traditional corporation.16 The analysis then describes how
benefit corporation legislation can create economic opportunity in Wyoming and
is consistent with Wyoming public policy.17 In conclusion, this comment argues
the Wyoming legislature should adopt benefit corporation legislation to create
more legal clarity, accountability, transparency, and economic opportunity.18

II. Background
A. The Traditional Binary Organizational System
State law and federal tax law principally require organizations to be either
for-profit or not-for-profit entities.19 Wyoming state law requires corporations to
be for-profit.20 Other state recognized entities, such as a limited liability company

10

See infra notes 19–30 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 68–77 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 78–122 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 19–77 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 78–122 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 137–69 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 137–69 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 170–80 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 137–80 and accompanying text.

Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road Forward
for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 345, 345 (2007) (“The U.S.
legal system largely divides organizations into two categories: for-profit and nonprofit.”).
19

20

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-140(a)(iv) (2011) (defining a corporation as for-profit).
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(LLC), have more flexibility.21 In Wyoming, an LLC must have a “lawful
purpose,” either for-profit or not-for-profit.22 However, if an LLC seeks not-forprofit status under the United States Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the partners’
profit-making capabilities are restricted.23 The IRC designates public charities
and private foundations as not-for-profit entities.24 A public charity that elects
to be a tax-exempt organization under the IRC must have a primary purpose in
furtherance of a charitable program.25 A private foundation that makes a similar
election must have the primary purpose of making grants to other charitable
organizations or to individuals outside the foundation.26
There are already some means by which organizations blur the boundaries
of this binary system.27 Traditional for-profit corporations, for example, will
make charitable gifts to not-for-profit organizations.28 Traditional for-profit
corporations can also further their charitable goals by creating distinct legal
entities that operate charitable divisions of their organization, which are usually
titled corporate foundations.29 Tax-exempt not-for-profit organizations can earn
some profits, but they cannot distribute these profits to shareholders or partners
in the same manner as for-profit corporations or LLCs.30

21
Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited Liability Company
Acts, 47 A.L.R. 6th 1, §18 (2008) (“The LLC’s operation is intended to be much more flexible that
a corporation’s . . . .”).

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-104(b) (“A limited liability company may have any
lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit.”).
22

23
See generally Richard A. McCray & Ward L. Thomas, Limited Liability Companies as Exempt
Organizations—Update, I.R.S. Exempt Org. Continuing Prof’l Educ. Technical Instruction
Program (2001), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf.

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010) (“[N]o part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual . . . .”).
24

25
Id.; see generally Life Cycle of a Public Charity/Private Foundation, I.R.S., http://www.irs.
gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=136459,00.html (last updated July 1, 2011) (describing the
requirements of being a recognized public charity or private foundation under the federal tax code).
26

I.R.C. § 509 (2010) (defining a private foundation).

Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
619, 619 (2010) (“This blurring of the boundary between for-profit and nonprofit has gone on for
years and appears only to be gaining steam.”).
27

28
See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2010) (allowing corporations a deduction for making charitable contributions).
29
Jim Fruchterman, For Love or Lucre, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev., Spring 2011, at 42,
46–47 (discussing how some organizations take advantage of both for-profit and not-for profit
governing structures and create two separate legal entities like Charles Schwab & Company
and Schwab Charitable, its affiliated nonprofit), available at http://www.ssireview.org/images/
articles/2011SP_Feature_Fruchterman.pdf.

I.R.C. § 4958(c) (2010). Tax-exempt not-for-profit organizations can earn profits; however,
if such an organization engages in an excess benefit transaction, an excise tax may be imposed on the
person or organization party to the transaction. Id.
30
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1. The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
The shareholder wealth maximization norm, and the uncertainty that
surrounds it, restricts directors, managers, and boards of traditional for-profit
corporations from considering broader stakeholder interests. Corporations that
wish to blur the boundaries of the binary organizational system in furtherance of
social and environmental purposes encounter hurdles resulting from the wealth
maximization norm.31 The shareholder wealth maximization norm, derived from
state corporate law and national corporate norms,32 stands for the proposition
that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.33 According to this
norm, directors can be held liable for not doing so.34 If directors of traditional forprofit corporations begin to take actions more aligned with those of not-for-profit
organizations, the directors might be held liable for violating their fiduciary duty
to shareholders.35 Jurists continue to debate the salience and applicability of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm, but this only further contributes to the
uncertainty for corporations that pursue social and environmental policies and
practices in addition to profits.36

31

See infra notes 32–67 and accompanying text.

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. Corp.
L. 657, 717 (1996) (“[S]hareholder wealth maximization norm . . . has been fully internalized by
American managers.”).
32

33
This comment will refer to this norm as the shareholder wealth maximization norm,
whereas it can also be called the “shareholder primacy norm.” See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Aaron
J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for Expanded Corporate
Democracy, 16 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 4 (2010) (referring to the shareholder wealth maximization
norm as the “shareholder primacy norm”).
34

See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.

Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate
Governance, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 989, 989 (2010) (“This perceived duty to maximize shareholder profits
lies at the heart of the conventional law-and-economics-laced view of corporate governance, thus
imposing a formidable obstacle to corporations wishing to become more sustainable.”).
35

See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, Fundamentals of Corporation Law 97 (1995) (arguing
scholars generally agree “that management’s principle fiduciary duty is to maximize the return to the
common shareholders”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev 1423, 1423 (1993) (arguing “the
mainstream of corporate law remains committed to the principles espoused by the Dodge court”).
But see, e.g., Jonathan Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. &
Bus. Rev. 177, 180 (2008) (arguing that “shareholder wealth maximization is widely accepted at the
level of rhetoric but largely ignored as a mater of policy implementation”); D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. Corp. L. 277, 278 (1998) (arguing “the shareholder primacy norm
is nearly irrelevant to the ordinary business decisions of modern corporations”); Lynn A. Stout, Why
We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. Bus. Rev. 163 (2008) (discussing why Dodge v. Ford
does not create an accurate representation of the purpose of a corporation).
36

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2012

5

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 12 [2012], No. 1, Art. 5

96

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 12

The 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case, Dodge v. Ford, is considered the
fountainhead of a director’s fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth.37 In
1916, Henry Ford paid his employees higher than average wages and promised
customers price discounts on the Model T.38 Before founding Oldsmobile,
brothers John and Horace Dodge were minority shareholders in the Ford Motor
Company39 and sued for the declaration of a special dividend.40 They thought that
the additional corporate profits Ford was distributing to corporate stakeholders,
such as employees and consumers, belonged to the corporate shareholders.41
The court ruled in favor of the Dodge brothers, holding that the purpose of a
corporation is to make money for its shareholders, and found Ford’s efforts to
benefit stakeholders were at the shareholders’ expense.42
Since Dodge v. Ford, courts have struggled to apply the shareholder wealth
maximization norm.43 Courts have difficulties evaluating whether directors
were acting to maximize shareholder value after the fact.44 Courts generally
evaluate directors’ actions in three different contexts: (1) day-to-day operations,
(2) defending against hostile takeovers, and (3) change-of-control transactions.45
In the first two contexts, courts apply the business judgment rule or the
modified business judgment rule respectively.46 Both of these standards carry the
“presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action

37
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see generally supra note
36 (citing commentaries on Dodge v. Ford and the case’s relationship to the shareholder wealth
maximization principle).
38
Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670–71 (discussing Ford Motor Company’s financials including the
policy of lowering selling prices).
39
Id. at 669 (“The parties in the first instance associating, who signed the articles, included
Henry Ford, whose subscription was for 255 shares, John F. Dodge, Horace E. Dodge, the
plaintiffs, Horace H. Rackham and James Couzens, who each subscribed for 50 shares, and several
other persons.”).
40
Id. at 673 (“Plaintiffs ask for an injunction to restrain the carrying out of the alleged
declared policy of Mr. Ford and the company, for a decree requiring the distribution to stockholders
of at least 75 percent of the accumulated cash surplus . . . .”).
41

Id. at 669.

Id. at 685 (“The decree of the court below fixing and determining the specific amount to
be distributed to stockholders is affirmed.”).
42

43
Macey, supra note 36, at 181 (comparing courts’ lack of ability to enforce the shareholder
wealth maximization norm to the highway patrols’ lack of ability to enforce the speed on
Connecticut’s Merritt Parkway).
44

Id. at 180–81.

Steven J. Haymore, Note, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B Corporations and the Delaware
Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1311, 1326 (2011).
45

46

Id.
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taken was in the best interest of the company.”47 Courts generally do not apply
the shareholder wealth maximization norm in these circumstances because courts
grant broad discretion to the directors to make decisions they believe are in the
best interest of the corporation.48
In contrast to the first two contexts, courts will apply the shareholder wealth
maximization norm in change-of-control situations.49 A change-of-control
situation occurs when the sale of a corporation is inevitable.50 In this situation,
the director’s primary duty becomes the “maximization of the company’s value
at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”51 Directors are thus required to accept
the highest reasonable offer in order to maximize shareholder wealth.52 In these
situations, directors cannot consider other stakeholders’ interests: “[C]oncern for
non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders
is in progress.”53 The language here is clear that the directors are prevented from
even considering the broader interests of the corporation and must solely focus on
shareholders’ interests and wealth maximization.54
Thirty states, including Wyoming, have adopted constituency statues to
allow directors to consider a broader range of interests beyond shareholder wealth
maximization in day-to-day decision-making, change of control situations,
and hostile takeovers.55 These statutes permit directors to consider the interests

Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 33, at 14 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)).
47

48

Id. at 17.

49

See infra notes 81–122 and accompanying text.

50

Haymore, supra note 45, at 1332.

Rakhi I. Patel, Facilitating Stakeholder-Interest Maximization: Accommodating Beneficial
Corporations in The Model Business Corporation Act, 23 St. Thomas L. Rev. 135, 147 (2010)
(quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986));
Haymore, supra note 45, at 1332.
51

52

Page & Katz, supra note 3, at 1370.

53

Haymore, supra note 45, at 1333 (quoting Revlon, Inc. 506 A.2d at 182).

54

Id.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-2702 (2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-756 (2011); Fla. Stat.
§ 607.0830(3) (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 414-221
(2011); Idaho Code Ann. § 30-1602 (2011); 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8.85 (2011); Ind. Code
§23-1-35-1 (2011); Iowa Code §491.101B (2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.12-210(4) (West
2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:92(G)(2) (2011); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 13-C, § 831 (2011); Md.
Code. Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2011); Minn. Stat. § 302A.251(5) (2011);
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2011); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 351.347 (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 14A:6-1(2), -14(4) (West 2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-11-35(D) (2011); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 717(b) (McKinney 2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-50(6) (2011); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1701.59(E) (West 2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.357(5) (2011); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1715 (2011);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-5.2-8(a) (2011); S.D. Codified Laws § 47-33-4(1) (2011); Tenn. Code Ann.
55
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of corporate employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and communities.56
Directors may also consider broader criteria such as the long-term interest of the
corporation, the economic climate, and, in change-of-control or hostile takeover
situations, whether stakeholders are best served by the continued independence of
the corporation.57
While constituency statutes give directors broader discretion to consider
interests beyond those of shareholders, they modify, but do not overcome the
shareholder wealth maximization norm. 58 First, constituency statutes do not go
beyond what a director can already do in making day-to-day decisions: consider
what is in the “best interest” of the corporation.59 Second, constituency statutes
are often vague and do not contain guidance as to how non-shareholder interests
may be considered.60 Finally, even the most expansive constituency statutes only
create the potential for directors to consider the effects of their decisions on nonshareholder interests, but never allow directors to consider stakeholders’ interest
above shareholders’ financial returns.61
Organizations with hybrid purposes, therefore, lack guidance regarding the
role shareholder wealth maximization plays in the business landscape. Risk-averse
directors of traditional corporate entities, along with their cautious counsel,
are often wary of considering stakeholders interests at the expense of financial
returns.62 Even though courts since Dodge v. Ford have struggled to apply the
wealth maximization norm and constituency statues take a small step to overcome
it, shareholder wealth maximization is the American corporate polestar.63 Milton

§§ 48-103-202, -204 (2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a)(3) (2011); Wis. Stat. § 180.0827
(2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-830(g) (2011). Constituency statutes are also referred to as “nonshareholder constituency statutes” and “other-constituency statutes.” 29 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts
§ 133 (2011).
56

29 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 133 (2011).

57

Id.

See John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 117, 135 (2010).
58

59

29 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 133 (2011).

60

Id.

Tyler, supra note 58, at 135 (explaining constituency statues create “no legal duty, obligation,
or responsibility that directors have to maximize or even ensure benefits to non-shareholders, and,
to the extent directors decide in one instance to protect non-shareholder interests, they are legally
free to change their mind with impunity” (citations omitted)).
61

W. Derrick Britt, R. Todd Johnson & Susan H. MacCormac, Frequently Asked Questions
Proposed Amendments to the California Corporations Code for a New Corporate Form: The Flexible
Purpose Corporation and Senate Bill 201, The California Working Group for New Corporate
Forms, Feb. 23, 2011 [hereinafter Working Group] (on file with author).
62

63

See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
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Friedman’s familiar maxim, “[t]he social responsibility of business is to increase
its profits,” encapsulates the principle.64 It is pervasive throughout court dicta,65
business school curriculums,66 and popular culture.67

2. The Lack of Accountability and Transparency Standards
Traditional for-profit entities lack structural mechanisms to assure
shareholders and consumers that organizations are operating in a socially and
environmentally responsible manner.68 In the absence of required accountability
and transparency standards, some traditional corporations will garner public
support and earn profits by making unsubstantiated claims of corporate social
and environmental responsibility.69 A corporation’s purported purpose beyond
shareholder wealth maximization can be completely unsupported.70 Additionally,
there is no mechanism in traditional for-profit entities that anchors a social or
environmental purpose.71 A business’ social purpose, therefore, can change or
disappear with new management or board directives.72

64
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, The New
York Times Magazine, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17.

See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 22 (Del. Ch. 2010). In
eBay Domestic Holdings, prominent corporate law jurist Chancellor Chandler offers his opinion as
to the purpose of a for-profit corporation:
65

Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.
The ‘Inc.’ after the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot accept as
valid for the purposes of implementing . . . a corporate policy that specifically, clearly,
and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .
Id. at 23.
Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: the Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31
J. Corp. L. 637, 654 (2006) (discussing that the shareholder wealth maximization norm was
implicit in most business school courses).
66

67
Joel Bakan, The Corporation: the Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power 34–35,
36–39, 41–42, 45, 53, 54–55, 142 (Constable & Robinson Ltd. 2004).
68

Working Group, supra note 62.

Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility
and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 Tul. L. Rev. 984, 1000 (2011); see, e.g., Steven D.
Lydenberg, Envisioning Socially Responsible Investing: A Model for 2006, J. Corp. Citizenship, July
2002, at 57 (“Although an increasing number of corporations publish environmental and health
and safety reports, many are simply token efforts—greenwashing . . . .” (citations omitted)).
69

70
See generally Cherry, supra note 69 (discussing how BP has capitalized on green marketing
campaigns, yet shown little change in policies and practices).
71

Working Group, supra note 62.

Id. (“[Traditional] corporate form presents risks for the entrepreneur seeking to maintain [a]
mission . . . . This difficulty in ‘anchoring the mission’ represents a significant issue for entrepreneurs
utilizing a blended value mode.”).
72
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Various not-for-profit organizations now offer private third-party
certifications and standards to evaluate business’ environmental and social
policies and practices.73 For example, many products in a local supermarket may
be marked with Rainforest Alliance and Fair Trade seals of approval.74 Some
supermarket buildings are even United States Green Building Council LEED
certified.75 While third-party certification systems, such as Rainforest Alliance,
Fair Trade, and LEEDs all fill important niches in evaluating a business’ policies
and practices, they are not comprehensive corporate social and environmental
responsibility certifications. These certifications are voluntary and limited to
specific aspects of corporate performance rather than assessing corporate practices
as a whole.76 Beyond these certifications, there are currently few standardized ways
for organizations to signal that they are satisfying their social and environmental
commitments.77 Businesses with hybrid purposes want this ability so they can
connect with socially conscious investors and consumers.

B. Hybrid Legal Entities
In response to the limitations of the current primarily binary organizational
system, proponents of social enterprise have developed various innovative hybrid
legal entities to better house organizations with hybrid purposes.78 These new legal
entities are considered hybrids because they attempt to blend aspects of for-profit

73

See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Certification, Verification and Validation Services, Rainforest Alliance, http://www.
rainforest-alliance.org/certification-verification (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (offering certification
for farms, forestry, ecotourism and forest-based carbon projects); Certification & Your Business, Fair
Trade USA, http://www.transfairusa.org/certification (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (“The Fair Trade
Certified™ label ensures consumers that the farmers and workers behind the product got a better
deal. . . . It reassures consumers that their purchases are socially and environmentally responsible.”).
74

75
See, e.g., Allyson Wendt, Grocery Store Earns LEED Gold, Green Source: The Magazine
Sustainable Design (Sept. 18, 2007), http://greensource.construction.com/news/070918PCC
NaturalMarkets.asp.

of

76
See Certification, Verification and Validation Services, supra note 74. For example, Rainforest
Alliance Certification offers a diverse set of certifications including forest certification, logging and
forest carbon verification and validation, and forest products chain-of-custody certification—all
of which look to a specific component of forestry. See id.; What LEED Is, U.S. Green Building
Council, http://www.usgbc.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (explaining that Leadership in Energy
and Environmental Design (LEEDs) measures green building design, construction, operation and
maintenance solutions).

See generally Steve Lydenberg & Graham Sinclair, Mainstream or Daydream? The Future
for Responsible Investing, J. Corp. Citizenship, Spring 2009, at 47 (discussing an increase in CSR
reporting but also arguing a need for more steps to be taken).
77

See generally Reiser, supra note 27 (describing on the complexities of social enterprises’
dual mission and the extent to which the governance structures of several hybrid forms relieve
this friction).
78
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organizations and not-for-profit organizations.79 States have passed legislation that
allows organizations to incorporate as or elect to become benefit corporations,
flexible purpose corporations, or low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs).80

1. Benefit Corporations
Benefit corporations are one legal entity, established at the state level, for
which social entrepreneurs advocate to facilitate social enterprise and business
with hybrid purposes. Since 2010, Maryland, Vermont, Virginia, New Jersey,
Hawaii, and California have passed legislation that creates benefit corporations.81
Under these new laws, benefit corporations must change their standard internal
governing documents to include a stated purpose that advances a “general public
benefit.”82 The legislation for each state defines “general public benefit” as a
“material, positive impact on society and the environment.”83 Although “material
positive impact” is not defined, the legislation requires an independent third-party
to evaluate the benefit corporation’s fulfillment of its “general public benefit.”84
An additional mechanism used to evaluate the general public benefit is a benefit
enforcement proceeding, which is a new right of action for shareholders and
other groups with standing to challenge the directors’ fulfillment of the general
public benefit.85
A benefit corporation may elect to have additional “specific public benefits,”
which are also evaluated by an independent third-party.86 Examples of “specific

79
Id. at 619 (“Each hybrid form draws on features found in existing organizational
frameworks, adding on organizational innovations.”).
80
See infra notes 81–122 and accompanying text. An additional hybrid entity is the socially
responsible corporation (SRC). Patel, supra note 51, at 150. Minnesota lawmakers have introduced
SRC legislation, but as of this writing, no such legislation has passed. Id.
81
Benefit Corporation Legislation, Certified B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/
publicpolicy (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (demonstrating that as of this writing, benefit corporation
has become law in six states).
82
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(C) (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 14A:18-1 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a) (2011); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1787(A) (2011).

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(C); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-787(A).
83

84
Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(C); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:1; Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 11A, § 21.08(a); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-787(A).
85
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(C); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.08(a); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-787(A).
86
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03(D); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782.
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public benefits” are “promoting economic opportunity for individuals or
communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business,”
“improving human health,” or “preserving or improving the environment.”87
One of the chief proponents of benefit corporation legislation is B Lab, a
not-for-profit organization. A group of social entrepreneurs and business veterans
founded B Lab to incubate and develop the new hybrid legal entity.88 B Lab created
its private B Corporation Certification System, which pioneered changing a
corporation’s internal documents in order to pursue a social benefit in addition to
profits.89 B Lab’s private B Corporation Certification was an important precursor
to state recognized benefit corporations, which implement similar changes with
the support of state statutory law.90 B Lab, in conjunction with corporate and
securities lawyers, developed and wrote model benefit corporation legislation.91
The state statutory requirements for becoming a benefit corporation closely
mirror B Lab’s private B Corporation Certification.92 States have since used B
Lab’s model legislation in drafting their own benefit corporation legislation to
create the new legal entity.93
B Lab assists, certifies, and audits corporations that wish to become and
maintain status as both state recognized benefit corporations and private Certified
B Corporations.94 B Lab has certified 465 businesses, which have a combined total
of $2.21 billion in revenue across sixty industries.95 For example, B Lab certified
the Colorado-based outdoors gear manufacturer, GoLite, in 2008, and Seventh
Generation, the nation’s most widely recognized brand of natural household
products, in the prior year.96

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03(D); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1;
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6).
87

See generally Jenna Lawrence, Making the B List, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. (2009),
http://www.ssireview.org/pdf/2009SU_What_Works_Lawrence.pdf (discussing the founding of
B Lab).
88

89

Id.

90

Certified B Corporation, supra note 7.

91

Id.

See generally Amendments to the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statues with Official Source
Notes and Committee Comments, Pa. Bar Ass’n Sec. on Bus. L., tit. 15 § 3331(e), http://www.
bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Draft_Pennsylvania-Legislation.pdf (last visited Nov.
30, 2011).
92

Id. William H. Clark, Jr. a partner in the Corporate & Securities Practice Group of Drinker
Biddle and Reath LLP, helped draft the model legislation along with B Lab. Id.
93

94

Id.

95

Id.

2011 B Corporation Annual Report, B Lab, at 7 (2011), http://www.bcorporation.net/
B-Media/2011-Annual-Report. In 2010, 3114 businesses were using the B Impact Rating System,
370 of which were Certified B Corporations. Id.
96
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2. Flexible Purpose Corporations
A flexible purpose corporation is a second legal entity for which social
entrepreneurs advocate at the state level to facilitate social enterprise and business
with hybrid purposes. California passed the first flexible purpose corporation
legislation in October 2011.97 Broadly speaking, flexible purpose corporations
are similar to benefit corporations. Both are designed to accommodate
profitability along with social and environmental purposes.98 Their similarities
are not accidental because B Lab provided advice in drafting the flexible purpose
corporation legislation as well.99
Flexible purpose corporations and benefit corporations, however, do have
a few important distinctions. First, a flexible purpose corporation must have a
“special purpose” as opposed to a benefit corporation’s required “general public
benefit.”100 The California legislation defines “special purpose” as charitable and
public purpose activities that a not-for-profit organization is authorized to carry
out.101 Second, the flexible purpose legislation does not require a third-party to
evaluate each “special purpose.”102 Third, flexible purpose corporation legislation
does not create a new right of action for the enforcement of their stated “special
purpose” and instead grants unfettered discretion to the director’s business
judgment in balancing the special purpose with maximizing shareholder value.103

3. Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies
A third legal entity for which social entrepreneurs advocate at the state level is a
low-profit limited liability company (L3C).104 Wyoming—along with eight other
states, the Oglala Sioux Tribe, and the Crow Indian Nation of Montana—has
passed L3C legislation.105 These jurisdictions have amended their LLC statutes

97
Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap Charity, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 2011, at B1.
98

Working Group, supra note 62.

99

Id.

100

Id.

Cal. Corp. Code § 2602 (West 2011). Benefit corporation legislation defines its “general
public benefit” as a “material positive impact on society and the environment.” Id.
101

102

Id.

103

Working Group, supra note 62.

See generally Tyler, supra note 58 (describing the L3C form, explaining its relevant
characteristic and correcting common misunderstandings about the L3C).
104

805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 180/1-26 (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:1302 (2011); Me. Rev.
Stat. tit. 31, § 1611 (2011); Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 450.4102 (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 57C-2-01 (2011); Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-412 (2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11,.§ 3001 (2011);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-102 (a)(ix) (2011); see generally Laws, Ams. for Cmty. Dev., http://www.
105
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to permit the formation of L3Cs, which produce income, accumulate wealth for
investors, and perform greater social purpose within a standardized form.106 L3Cs
are tailored for organizations with needs that differ from benefit corporations and
flexible purpose corporations.107 L3Cs are designed to accommodate for-profit
entrepreneurs with primarily charitable purposes that want to attract programrelated investments (PRIs) from foundations.108
PRIs are loans or investments made by non-profit, private foundations that
qualify for two special conditions under federal tax law.109 First, PRIs qualify as
part of a foundation’s required annual charitable distribution.110 Second, PRIs
are not jeopardizing investments, which means a foundation is not subject to
excise taxes when making PRIs.111 This is because a PRI’s primary purpose must
be to accomplish one or more of the foundation’s tax-exempt purposes.112 These
two unique tax conditions make PRIs a good vehicle for the distribution of
charitable capital.113
Under traditional LLC statutes, without an L3C election, an LLC can
receive PRIs.114 However, a foundation must perform extra due diligence on
an organization-by-organization basis to make sure each LLC will comply with
federal tax law’s PRI requirements.115 This additional work can deter foundations
from investing in LLCs and prevent LLCs from accessing necessary charitable
capital.116 L3Cs, by contrast, are specifically formed with the United States

americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.php. (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) (demonstrating
that L3C legislation has been enacted in nine states and is also a component of the jurisprudence of
two Native American tribes).
106

Working Group, supra note 62.

107

See infra notes 78–121 and accompanying text.

108
Smiddy, supra note 5, at 6 (“[L3C] . . . is a form of social enterprise combining profitmaking objectives with serving social goals. The L3C form was originally created for the narrow
purpose of facilitating foundations’ willingness to make program-related investments in for-profit
companies.” (citations omitted)).
109

Reiser, supra note 27, at 622 (discussing PRIs special treatment under federal tax law).

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

Luther M. Ragin, Jr., Program-Related Investments in Practice, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 53, 54–55
(2010) (discussing the Heron Foundation’s experience with making PRIs).
113

114

Id.

115

Id.

Arthur Wood, New Legal Structures to Address the Social Capital Famine, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 45,
50 (2010).
116
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Treasury Department’s PRI regulations in mind.117 The L3C designation signals to
foundations that the entity is PRI compatible, which increases the organization’s
ability to generate capital from foundations.118
Since the Wyoming state legislature passed L3C legislation in February
2009, twenty-six Wyoming organizations have elected to become L3Cs.119 One
example is the community development software company Univicty.120 Univicity
reincorporated from a registered not-for-profit organization to an L3C because
the Internal Revenue Service disallowed it from developing for-profit software as
a not-for-profit organization.121 The L3C form enables Univicity and others to
promote a social mission while raising limited capital though for-profit ventures
and foundation PRIs.122

III. Analysis
The traditional for-profit corporate form offers limited flexibly, accountability,
and transparency; thus making it a less than ideal legal organizational form for
social enterprise.123 Benefit corporation legislation creates a hybrid alternative
to better house social enterprise and business with hybrid purposes.124 The first
problem of the traditional corporate form that benefit corporation legislation
addresses is the shareholder wealth maximization norm.125 This comment argues
benefit corporation legislation creates legal certainty amidst the shareholder wealth
maximization norm debate by making innovative changes to the standard internal
documents of a corporation and by supporting these changes with state statutory
law.126 These two measures avoid conflicts between social missions and shareholder
wealth maximization.127 The second problem with traditional corporate entities
that benefit corporation legislation addresses is the lack of social and environmental
accountability standards to distinguish those organizations that only make claims
of social responsibility from those that take action to back up their claims.128

117

See Tyler, supra note 58, at 121.

Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations and Questions to
Ponder, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 163, 167 (2010).
118

119
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-102 (a)(ix) (2011); see also Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, InterSector
Partners, L3C, http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
120

About Univicity, Univicity, http://www.univicity.com/about (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).

121

Id.

122

See supra notes 104–20 and accompanying text.

123

See supra notes 125–78 and accompanying text.

124

See infra notes 125–78 and accompanying text.

125

See infra notes 134–49 and accompanying text.

126

See infra notes 134–49 and accompanying text.

127

See infra note 149 and accompanying text.

128

See infra notes 151–63 and accompanying text.
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This comment examines benefit corporation legislation’s two mechanisms for
creating accountability standards: (1) internal enforcement proceedings; and
(2) mandatory independent third-party evaluations.129 Benefit corporation
legislation addresses a third problem with traditional entities—a lack of
transparency.130 The legislation creates mandatory reporting guidelines that
provide transparency and further contribute to accountability within corporate
responsibility.131 Further, as a matter of policy, benefit corporation legislation is
appropriate for Wyoming.132 This comment argues the Wyoming legislature should
adopt benefit corporation legislation to create more legal clarity, accountability,
transparency, and economic opportunity in the field of social enterprise.133

A. Resolving the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
Benefit corporation legislation circumvents the shareholder wealth
maximization norm by requiring changes to a corporation’s internal corporate law
and to a state’s statutory law.134 These changes create more legal clarity for social
enterprise and organizations with hybrid purposes.135 The legislation takes steps
to avoid conflicts between an organization’s social mission and shareholder profits
in an effort to prevent possible litigation between directors and shareholders.136

1. Benefit Corporation Legislation Requires Changes to Internal
Corporate Law
Benefit corporation legislation addresses the shareholder wealth maximization
norm by requiring organizations that seek to incorporate, or reincorporate, as a
benefit corporation to make changes to their internal law—the requirements set
forth in a corporation’s articles of incorporation and bylaws.137 First, a corporation’s
articles must include a benefit corporation election.138 Second, the articles must

129

See infra notes 151–63 and accompanying text.

130

See infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.

131

See infra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.

132

See infra notes 170–80 and accompanying text.

133

See infra notes 135–78 and accompanying text.

134

See infra notes 135–78 and accompanying text.

135

See infra notes 137–49 and accompanying text.

136

See infra note 149 accompanying text.

Stout, supra note 36, at 168 (“‘Corporate law’ can itself be broken down into three rough
categories: (1) ‘internal’ corporate law (that is, the requirements set out in individual corporations’
charters and bylaws); (2) state corporate codes; and (3) corporate case law.”).
137

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03(A) (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 14A:18-1 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, §§ 21.04, 21.03(a)(1) (2011); Va. Code Ann.
§ 13.1-784 (2011).
138
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state that the corporation has the purpose of creating general public benefit.139
These two provisions within the corporation’s internal documents explicitly state
that the purpose of the corporation goes beyond generating shareholder profits.
The legislation also allows a benefit corporation to state a purpose that creates
specific public benefits within its articles of incorporation.140 In stating these, the
corporation has the opportunity to add a more focused social or environmental
mission to its internal documents. Examples of specific public benefits include:
improving human health; promoting the arts, sciences, or the advancement of
knowledge; and promoting economic opportunity beyond the creation of jobs
in the normal course of business.141 State benefit corporation legislation can
include examples of “specific public benefits,” while also providing flexibility for
a corporation to compose its own social or environmental purposes.142 Benefit
corporation legislation requires benefit corporations to imbed their broader
corporate purpose into their corporate DNA, thus, refuting the shareholder
wealth maximization norm.

2. Benefit Corporation Legislation Requires Changes to State
Statutory Law
Benefit corporation legislation also establishes an exception to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm by creating statutory law that protects
corporate directors from shareholder derivative suits when considering broader
corporate stakeholders’ interests, possibly at shareholders’ financial expense.
Under benefit corporation legislation, directors may consider the interests of
shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers when making decisions about
the corporation.143 Directors may also consider the interests of the community,
the environment, short-term and long-term goals of the corporation, and the
corporation’s ability to accomplish any specific public benefits it has elected.
Further, directors are not obligated to give priority to any of these interests,
including shareholder wealth maximization.144 Benefit corporation legislation
changes state statutory law to ease the friction between shareholder wealth

139
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-06(A); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:5; Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, §§ 21.08(a); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-786.
140
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03(D); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782.

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03(D); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782.
141

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03(D); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-1;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(6); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782.
142

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-07(A) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6; Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, §§ 21.09, 21.03(a)(1); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-788.
143

144

See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(3).
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maximization and social and environmental purposes.145 Thus, directors can
have more freedom to pursue corporate social responsibility through social and
environmental policies and practices.
Constituency statues allow directors of traditional corporations to consider
some level of stakeholders’ interests; however, they do not allow as much
consideration as benefit corporation legislation. The most expansive constituency
statutes only create the potential for directors to consider the effects of their
decisions on non-shareholder interests, but never allow directors to consider
stakeholders’ interest above shareholders’ financial interests.146 Benefit corporation
legislation provides broader discretion for directors to consider stakeholders’
interest and the furtherance of the corporation’s general public benefit and any
identified specific public benefits.
Benefit corporation legislation also creates statutory law that protects
shareholders. Benefit corporation legislation requires a two-thirds supermajority
vote in order for a traditional corporation to convert into a benefit corporation.147
This enables shareholders to help decide whether they want their current
investment to be converted into an investment in a benefit corporation. There
are additional provisions to protect shareholders once an organization is a benefit
corporation. A supermajority vote is required for a benefit corporation to merge
with any other organization, to remove its general public benefit provision, or to
change any stated specific public benefits.148 These measures anchor the benefit
corporation’s social mission. They ensure that directors or managers cannot
change the direction of the corporation through a merger or change its purpose
without shareholder approval. If a shareholder or consumer invests in a benefit
corporation, these provisions can give them confidence that the corporation’s
general and specific public purposes will not change or disappear without
their knowledge.

3. Benefit Corporation Legislation Helps Prevent Litigation for
Social Enterprise
Benefit corporation legislation requires changes to a corporation’s internal
documents and a state’s statutory law with the intent to prevent litigation
involving directors and shareholders of corporations with a social or environmental

145

See infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.

146

Id.

See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, §§ 21.05 (“Any corporation organized under this title
may become a benefit corporation by amending its articles of incorporation . . . the amendment
shall be approved by the higher of: (A) the vote required by the articles of incorporation; or
(B) two-thirds of the votes entitled to be case by the outstanding shares of the corporation . . . .”).
147

148

Id.
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purpose. Shareholders of benefit corporations essentially agree that profits and
returns should not be the exclusive purpose of the corporation. This agreement
is incorporated both into the new entities’ operating provisions and into state
statutory requirements.149 Although no decisional law exists to date that supports
or opposes benefit corporation legislation, the provisions in benefit corporation
legislation establish legal clarity regarding a benefit corporation’s hybrid purpose.
This clarity is designed to ease the tension between the shareholder wealth
maximization norm and corporations’ social and environmental purposes to keep
benefit corporations out of court.

B. Benefit Corporation Legislation Establishes Accountability Standards for
Corporate Social Responsibility
Benefit corporation legislation establishes standards of social and environmental
accountability through two mechanisms: an internal enforcement proceeding and
an independent evaluator.150 Benefit corporation legislation creates a new right
of action through “benefit enforcement proceedings.”151 Shareholders, directors,
parent companies, and any other persons or groups that may be specified in the
articles of incorporation can bring an action against a director.152 The causes of
action available to these parties in the benefit enforcement proceedings include a
failure to pursue the general public benefit or any specific public benefit set forth
in its articles of incorporation.153 The benefit enforcement proceedings provides a
forum for parties with standing to challenge the benefit corporation’s fulfillment
of its stated general or specific public benefit to ensure accountability.
Benefit corporation legislation’s second mechanism that establishes
accountability is its requirement that an independent third-party verify the benefit
corporation’s efforts to fulfill its general public benefit and any specific public
benefits.154 The third-party standard must be a recognized standard or certification
system for defining, reporting, and assessing corporate social and environmental
performance.155 One example of a qualified third-party standard is B Lab’s

149

See supra notes 137–48 and accompanying text.

150

See infra notes 151–63 and accompanying text.

151

See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:10 (West 2011).

152

Id.

See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.13(c)(1) (“‘[B]enefit enforcement proceeding’ means
a claim or action against a director or officer for . . . failure to pursue the general public benefit
purpose of the benefit corporation or any specific public benefit purpose set forth in its articles
of incorporation . . . .”).
153

154
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-08(A)(2) (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 14A:18-7 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.03; Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782 (2011).
155
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(E); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-; Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.03; Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-782.
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certification program, which evaluates organizations’ social and environmental
policies.156 B Lab evaluates whether benefit corporations meet comprehensive and
transparent social and environmental performance standards by using its B Impact
Assessment.157 The B Impact Assessment employs a survey that poses questions
regarding a company’s governance, environmental impact, community outreach,
and employee treatment.158 The content of the survey varies depending on the
size and the type of company.159 The corporate chief operating officer usually
completes the survey with assistance from other departments of the company.160
After the B Impact Assessment, B Lab generates a B Impact Report, which scores
the organizations different policies and practices.161 Another example of an
acceptable independent third-party standard is the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI).162 The GRI has established Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and has
published assessment reports on a wide-variety of industries.163

C. Benefit Corporation Legislation Establishes Transparency Standards for
Corporate Social Responsibility
Benefit corporation legislation establishes transparency by requiring a
benefit corporation to disclose information about its social and environmental
practices and policies to investors, consumers, and the general public.164 The new

2011 B Corporation Annual Report, B Lab, at 34 (2011), http://www.bcorporation.net/
resources/bcorp/documents/B%20Corp_2011-Annual-Report.pdf. Southern Energy Management
is a sustainable energy company serving southeastern United States certified on Nov. 23, 2009;
Benchmark Asset Managers is a group of investment advisors and portfolio managers certified on
June 1, 2007; and GoLite is an outdoor-gear manufacturer certified on Dec. 18, 2008. Id.
156

Id. Since the passage of state benefit corporation legislation, the B Impact Rating System
now can be used for the public certification of a state recognized benefit corporation or the private
certification of a Certified B Corporation. Id.
157

158

Lawrence, supra note 88, at 65.

159

Id.

160

Id.

Chris Fleisher, To ‘B’ or Not to ‘B’?, Valley News, Apr. 4, 2010, at C1; see also The B Impact
Assessment, Certified B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.net/become/BRS (last visited Nov.
30, 2011).
161

Who is Responsible for GRI?, Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org/
AboutGRI/FAQs/FAQAboutGRI.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). The Global Reporting Initiative
is a non-profit based in Amsterdam that originated as part of the United Nations Environment
Programme. Id.
162

163
Is the GRI Reporting Framework Relevant to my Organization or Sector?, Global Reporting
I nitiative , http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/FAQs/FAQSustainabilityReporting.
htm#AnchorFive (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). Automobile manufactures, pharmaceutical companies,
consumer products industries, public authorities and not-for-profit organizations have all published
reports with GRI. Id.

See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01(E)2 (2011); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:1811 (West 2011); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 21.14 (2011);Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-790(c) (2011).
164
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legislation requires a benefit corporation to publish an annual “benefit report,”
which addresses the ways the corporation pursued its general and specific public
benefits during the year.165 The benefit report is distributed to each shareholder
and accessible to the public at the corporation’s website.166 Failure to comply
with these reporting requirements can cause an organization to forfeit its status
as a benefit corporation.167 These reports offer information and insight into the
corporation’s social and environmental policies and practices. The transparency
measures distinguish benefit corporations from traditional corporations, which
will often guard their internal policies and practices or only publish them when
they can present the corporation in a favorable light. Additionally, benefit reports
further contribute to the accountability of benefit corporations.
In addition to these specific transparency requirements, the innovative legal
structure of benefit corporations highlights their social commitment to potential
investors and consumers. Benefit corporations must explicitly state their social
goals in their articles of incorporation.168 The innovative legal structure of benefit
corporations and the corresponding mechanisms for establishing accountability
significantly contribute to greater transparency, thus educating and attracting
socially conscious investors and consumers. Accountability and transparency
standards help distinguish organizations that take credible action from those that
merely hide behind the claim of corporate social responsibility.169

D. Benefit Corporation Legislation Creates Economic Opportunity
for Wyoming
Proponents of benefit corporation legislation in other states have emphasized
its ability to offer states and their corporate constituents a competitive economic
advantage.170 Just as Univicity chose to incorporate in Wyoming because it had
enacted L3C legislation, other businesses may choose Wyoming if it enacts
benefit corporation legislation. By recognizing benefit corporations, Wyoming
may create a more hospitable environment to new businesses interested in social
enterprise and attract more entrepreneurs and jobs to the state.
See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-08(A); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:18-11;
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A § 21.14; Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-791.
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See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-791(C).

See, e.g., Amendments to the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statues with Official Source Notes and
Committee Comments, supra note 92, tit. 15 § 3331(e) (discussing the consequences for failing to file
the Annual Benefit Report).
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Haymore, supra note 45, at 1343 (discussing how traditional institutional investors may
shy away from alternative entities like benefit corporations, while social entrepreneurs may be more
attracted to them).
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See generally Cherry & Sneirson, supra note 68.

David Adelman, Just What California Needs: A New Corporate Form, Los Angeles Law.,
Apr. 2011, at 68.
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Benefit corporations’ broader missions, beyond solely maximizing shareholder
wealth, may produce more corporate profits in the short and long term.171
For example, Norwood Marbles & Granite, a Maryland stone fabrication and
installation company which has supplied stone for the Washington Monument
and the White House, reincorporated as a benefit corporation in 2010.172 When
it sought third-party certification from B Lab, it initially failed the B Impact
Assessment Survey.173 Norwood then used what it learned from the survey to
change certain aspects of its operations.174 Norwood Marbles & Granite, which
once only recycled a fraction of its millions of gallons of water used in its processing
plants, now recycles ninety-eight percent.175 It subsequently passed the B Impact
Assessment and now saves $10,500 a month in utility expenses creating greater
profits and water savings for the state.176

E. Benefit Corporation Legislation Aligns with Wyoming Public Policy
Social enterprise and the benefit corporation reflect libertarian values.
While corporate social responsibility often appears to be progressive cause,
social enterprise is a libertarian movement.177 Benefit corporation legislation
offers voluntary solutions to enhance corporate social responsibility because a
corporation’s founders, directors, and shareholders can define their own social or
environmental purpose as opposed to abiding by one mandated by state or federal
regulation.178 An organization opts to become a benefit corporation only if this
legal form meets its business needs. Further, an independent third-party evaluates a
benefit corporation’s fulfillment of its social or environmental purpose as opposed
to being regulated and evaluated by the government. Corporations’ legal status
as benefit corporations and the transparency and accountability requirements
it entails, offer consumers more information to choose what corporations
to patronize.

See generally Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does It Pay to be Good? A Meta-Analysis and Redirection
of Research on the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial Performance, at 21 (July 26,
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (offering a meta-analysis of the empirical link between corporate social
performance and corporate financial performance and its overall small positive effect), available at http://
stakeholder.bu.edu/Docs/Walsh,%20Jim%20Does%20It%20Pay%20to%20Be%20Good.pdf .
171

About Norwood Granite & Marble, Certified B Corporation, http://www.bcorporation.
net/norwood (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
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Issie Lapowsky, B Corporations, Inc., May 2011, at 78.
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Wyoming has a history of implementing novel corporate structures. In 1977,
Wyoming became the first state to pass limited liability company legislation.179
Once again, Wyoming is at the forefront as one of only a handful of states to
have passed L3C legislation.180 The legislature’s passage of benefit corporation
legislation would continue Wyoming’s tradition of corporate innovation
and opportunity.

IV. Conclusion
Benefit corporation legislation offers significant innovation to a slowly
changing American corporate landscape. Benefit corporation legislation does not
mark the end of the corporate social responsibility debate. It would be expecting
too much of the organizational form to believe benefit corporation legislation
alone could create corporate social responsibility throughout the state and country.
Benefit corporation legislation, however, does offer legal clarity, transparency, and
accountability for businesses, consumers, and investors interested in corporate
social responsibility.
The value of benefit corporation legislation lies in the innovative legal
structure that creates legal clarity for businesses engaging in social enterprise.181
Additionally, benefit corporation legislation’s reliance on private third-party
certification proves to investors and consumers that businesses are “making good”
on their social and environmental purposes, and distinguishes benefit corporations
from those that are simply making claims for public relations purposes.182 These
measures allow investors, directors, and consumers to be aware of and act on a
corporation’s hybrid purpose. Though many corporations do engage in a socially
and environmentally responsible manner, without a legal form such as the benefit
corporation, these “good actors” are hard to distinguish from others.183 While
courts have yet to examine benefit corporations’ legal structure, the goal of this
model legislation is to keep social enterprise out of the courts and on track with
their hybrid missions.

Burke & Sessions, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub S and
Limited Partnerships?, 54 J. Tax’n 232, 234 (1981).
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See supra notes 105–21 and accompanying text (discussing L3Cs in Wyoming).

See supra notes 137–63 and accompanying text (laying out the structural changes to benefit
corporation’s internal documents and the statutory law that supports them).
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See supra notes 151–63 and accompanying text (discussing benefit corporation’s mechanisms
for accountability).
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